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Abstract. In a multi-objective game, each agent individually evaluates each over-
all action-profile on multiple objectives. I generalize the price of anarchy to multi-
objective games and provide a polynomial-time algorithm to assess it1.
This work asserts that policies on tobacco promote a higher economic efficiency.
1 Introduction
Economic agents, for each individual decision, make a trade off between multiple objec-
tives, like for instance: time, resources, goods, financial income, sustainability, happi-
ness and life. This motivated the introduction of a super-class of games: multi-objective
(MO) games [5,22]. Each agent evaluates each overall action profile by a vector. His in-
dividual preference is a partial rationality modelled by the Pareto-dominance. It induces
Pareto-Nash-equilibria (PN) as the overall selfish outcomes. Furthermore, concerning
economic models, such vectorial evaluations are a humble backtrack from the intrinsic
and subjective theories of value, towards a non-theory of value where the evaluations
are maintained vectorial, in order to enable partial rationalities and to avoid losses of
information in the model. In this more realistic (behaviourally less assumptive) frame-
work, in order to avoid critical losses of information on the several objectives in the
model, thoroughly computing efficiency is a tremendous necessity [13,23].
The literature on MO games is disparate and will be presented where relevant. After
the preliminaries below, Section 2 generalizes the coordination ratio (CR, better known
as “price of anarchy”) to MO games. Section 3 applies it to the efficiency of tobacco
economy. Section 4 provides algorithms1 to assess the MO-CR.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents. Let Ai denote each agent i’s action-
set (discrete, finite). Each agent i decides an action ai ∈ Ai. Given a subset of agents
M ⊆ N , let AM denote ×i∈MAi and let A = AN denote the set of overall action-
profiles. Let O = {1, , . . . , d} denote the set of all the objectives, with d fixed. Let
vi : A→ Rd+ denote an agent i’s individual MO evaluation function, which maps each
overall action-profile a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A to an MO evaluation vi(a) ∈ Rd+. Hence,
agent i’s evaluation for objective k is vik(a) ∈ R+. Given an overall action-profile
a ∈ A, aM is the restriction of a to AM , and a−i to AN\{i}.
Definition 1. A Multi-objective Game (MOG) is a tuple
(
N, {Ai}i∈N ,O, {vi}i∈N
)
.
For instance, MO games encompass single-objective (discrete) optimization problems,
MO optimization problems and non-cooperative games. Assuming α = |Ai| ∈ N for
each agent, the representation of an MOG requires nαn d-dimensional vectors.
1 Appendix A shows that “smoothness” analysis [20] cannot be applied to MO games.
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Let us now supply the vectors with a preference relation. Assuming a maximization
setting, given x, y ∈ Rd+, the following relations state respectively that y (1) weakly-
Pareto-dominates and (2) Pareto-dominates x:
y % x ⇔ ∀k ∈ O, yk ≥ xk (1)
y  x ⇔ ∀k ∈ O, yk ≥ xk and ∃k ∈ O, yk > xk (2)
The Pareto-dominance is a partial order, inducing a multiplicity of Pareto-efficient out-
comes. Formally, the set of efficient vectors is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Pareto-efficiency). For Y ⊆ Rd+, the efficient vectors EFF[Y ] ⊆ Y are:
EFF[Y ] = {y∗ ∈ Y | ∀y ∈ Y, not (y  y∗)}
(Similarly, let WST[Y ] = {y− ∈ Y s.t. ∀y ∈ Y, not (y−  y)} denote the subset
of worst vectors.) Pareto-efficiency enables to define as efficient all the trade-offs that
cannot be improved on one objective without being downgraded on another one, that is:
the best compromises between objectives (see e.g. Figure 1).
At the individual scale, Pareto-efficiency defines a partial rationality, enabling to
model behaviours that single-objective (SO) games would not model consistently.
Definition 3 (Pareto-Nash equilibrium [22]). In an MOG, an action-profile a ∈ A is
a Pareto-Nash equilibrium (denoted by a ∈ PN), if and only if, for each agent i ∈ N :
vi(ai, a−i) ∈ EFF [ vi(Ai, a−i) ]
where vi(Ai, a−i) denotes {vi(bi, a−i) | bi ∈ Ai}.
Pareto-Nash equilibria encompass most behaviourally possible action-profiles. For in-
stance, whatever an agent’s subjective linear positive weighted combination of the ob-
jectives, his decision is Pareto-efficient. One can distinguish behavioural objectives in-
ducing PN and also objectives on which to focus an efficiency study.
Equilibrium existence. In many sound probabilistic settings [7,8,18], Pareto effi-
ciency is not demanding on the conditions of individual rationality, hence there are
multiple Pareto-efficient responses. Consequently, pure PN are numerous in average:
|PN| ∈ Θ(α d−1d n), justifying their existence in a probabilistic manner. Furthermore, in
MO games with MO potentials [15,17,19], the existence is guaranteed.
Example 1 (A didactic toy-example in Ocean Shores). Five shops in Ocean Shores (the
nodes) can decide upon two activities: renting bikes or buggies, selling clams or fruits,
etc. Each agent evaluates his local action-profile depending on the actions of his inner-
neighbours and according to two objectives: financial revenue and sustainability.
v1
v2
v3
v4 v5
v2 a1 b1
a2 (9, 1) (11, 5)
b2 (12, 12) (8, 15)
v3 a1 b1
a3 (14, 18) (5, 12)
b3 (1, 8) (7, 11)
v5 a4 b4
a5 (10, 8) (12, 7)
b5 (16, 4) (2, 10)
a2 b2
v1 a3 b3 a3 b3
a4 b4 a4 b4 a4 b4 a4 b4
a1 (14, 4) (3, 15) (4, 10) (10, 12) (5, 10) (1, 3) (11, 13) (12, 15)
b1 (7, 14) (10, 6) (6, 13) (1, 8) (6, 15) (3, 11) (1, 5) (15, 14)
a1 b1
v4 a5 b5 a5 b5
a4 (9, 16) (16, 14) (15, 8) (11, 15)
b4 (12, 16) (6, 1) (13, 10) (12, 5)
b
b
For instance, we have (b1, b2, a3, b4, b5) ∈ PN, since each of these individual actions,
given the adversary local action profile (column), is Pareto-efficient among the two
actions of the agent (row). Even if the relative values of the objectives cannot be cer-
tainly ascertained, all the subjectively efficient vectors are encompassed by the indi-
vidual Pareto-efficiency. In this MO game, there are 13 Pareto-Nash-equilibria, which
utilitarian evaluations are depicted in Figure 1 (Section 2).
2 The Multi-objective Coordination Ratio
It is well known in game theory that an equilibrium can be overall inefficient with regard
to the sum of the individual evaluations. This loss of efficiency is measured by the coor-
dination ratio2 (CR) [3,4,6,10,12,20,21] min[u(PE)]/max[u(A)]. Regrettably, when
focusing on one sole objective (e.g. making money or a higher GDP), there are losses
of efficiency that are not measured (e.g. non-sustainability of productions or produc-
tion of addictive carcinogens). This appeals for a more thorough analysis of the loss of
efficiency at equilibrium and the definition of a multi-objective coordination ratio.
The utilitarian social welfare u : A → Rd+ is a vector-valued function measuring
social welfare with respect to the d objectives: u(a) =
∑
i∈N v
i(a), excluding the
purely behavioural objectives that cause irrationality [23]. Given a function f : A→ Z,
the image set f(E) of a subsetE ⊆ A is defined by f(E) = {f(a)|a ∈ E} ⊆ Z. Given
ρ, y, z ∈ Rd+, the vector ρ ? y ∈ Rd+ is defined by ∀k ∈ O, (ρ ? y)k = ρkyk and the
vector y/z ∈ Rd+ is defined by ∀k ∈ O, (y/z)k = yk/zk. For x ∈ Rd+, x ? Y denotes
{x ? y ∈ Rd+ | y ∈ Y }. Given x ∈ Rd+, C(x) denotes {y ∈ Rd+ | x % y}. I also
introduce3 the notations E and F , illustrated in Figures 1 and 3:
– A = u(A) the set of outcomes. (•)
– E = u(PN) the equilibria outcomes. ()
– F = EFF[u(A)] the efficient outcomes. (×)
For SO games, the worst-case efficiency
of equilibria is measured by the CR
min[u(PE)]/max[u(A)]. However, for MO
games, there are many equilibria and optima,
and a ratio of the (green) set E over the (red) set
F is not defined yet and ought to maintain the
information on each objective without introducing
dictatorial choices.
Fig. 1: The bi-objective utilitar-
ian vectors of Ocean Shores
I introduce a multi-objective CR. Firstly, the efficiency of one equilibrium y ∈ E
is quantified without taking side with any efficient outcome, by defining with flexibil-
ity and no dictatorship, a disjunctive set of guaranteed ratios of efficiency R[y,F ] =⋃
z∈F C(y/z). Secondly, in MOGs, in average, there are many Pareto-Nash-equilibria.
An efficiency guarantee ρ ∈ Rd+, must hold for each equilibrium-outcome, inducing the
2 As Smoothness [20] cannot be applied to MO games, I cannot use the term Price of Anarchy.
3 To enable ratios, one can do the minor assumption F ⊆ Rd++.
conjunctive definition of the set of guaranteed ratios R[E ,F ] = ⋂y∈E R[y,F ]. Techni-
cally, R[E ,F ] only depends on WST[E ] and F . Finally, if two bounds on the efficiency
ρ and ρ′ are such that ρ  ρ′, then ρ′ brings no more information, hence, MO-CR is
defined by using EFF on the guaranteed efficiency ratios R[WST[E ],F ]. This MO-CR
satisfies a set of key properties detailed in Appendix B.
Definition 4 (MO Coordination Ratio). Given an MOG, a vector ρ ∈ Rd+ bounds
the MOG’s inefficiency if and only if it holds that: ∀y ∈ E , ∃z ∈ F , y/z % ρ.
Consequently, the set of guaranteed ratios is defined by:
R[E ,F ] =
⋂
y∈E
⋃
z∈F
C(y/z)
and the MO-CR is defined by: MO-CR[E ,F ] = EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]]
Example 2 (The Efficiency ratios of Example 1). I depict the efficiency ratios of Ocean
Shores (intersected with [0, 1]d) which depend of WST[E ] = {(30, 53), (40, 38)} and
F = {(46, 61), . . . , (69, 31)}. The part below the red line corresponds toR[(30, 53),F ],
the part below the blue line toR[(40, 38),F ] and the yellow part below both lines is the
conjunction on both equilibria R[WST[E ],F ]. The freedom degree of deciding what
the overall efficiency should be is left free (no
dictatorship) which results in several ratios in
the MO-CR. Firstly, for each ρ ∈ R[E ,F ], we
have ρ1 ≤ 65%. Hence, whatever the choices
of overall efficiency, one cannot guarantee more
than 65% of efficiency on objective 1. Secondly,
there are some subjectivities for which the effi-
ciency on objective 2 is already total (100%, if
not more) while situation on objective 1 is worse
and only 50% can be obtained. Thirdly, from
50% to 65% of subjective efficiency on objec-
tive 1, the various subjectivities range the effi-
ciency on objective 2 from 100% to 75%.
ρ1
ρ2
Fig. 2: The MO-CR of Ocean Shores
F = EFF[u(A)]
u2
E = u(PN)
u(A)
u1
F : efficient outcomes
E : equilibria outcomes
ρ ⋆ F
Having ρ in MO-CR means that for each
y ∈ E , there is an efficient outcome z(y) ∈
F such that y dominates ρ ? z(y). In other
words, if ρ ∈ R[E ,F ], then each equilib-
rium satisfies the ratio of efficiency ρ. This
means that equilibria-outcomes are at least
as good as ρ?F . That is: E ⊆ (ρ?F)+Rd+.
Moreover, since ρ is tight, E sticks to ρ?F .
Fig. 3: ρ ∈ MO-CR bounds below E’s inefficiency: E ⊆ (ρ ? F) + Rd+
3 Application to Tobacco Economy
Tobacco consumption is a striking example of economic inefficiency induced by
bounded rationalities. According to the World Health Organisation [25], 17.000 hu-
mans die each day of smoking related diseases (one person per 5 seconds). Meanwhile,
addictive satisfaction and the financial revenue of the tobacco industry fosters consump-
tion and production. According to the subjective theory of value [24], some economists
would say: “Since consumers value the product, then the industry creates value.” Ac-
cording to other health economists [23], most consumers become addict before age 18,
and as adults, would prefer a healthier life, but fail to opt-out.
The theory of MO games, based on a non-theory of value, just maintains vectorial
evaluations and properly considers dollars, addiction and life expectancy as distinct
objectives, with PN equilibria encompassing the relevant behaviours, even irrational.
We modelled the tobacco industry and its consumers [1,13] by a succinct MOG,
with the help of (..) the association4 “Alliance contre le tabac”. The set of agents is
N = {industry, ν consumers}, where there are about ν = 6.109 prospective con-
sumers. Each consumer decides in Aconsumer = {not-smoking, smoking} and cares
about money, his addictive pleasure, and living. The industry only cares about money
and decides in Aindustry = {not-active, active, advertise&active}. We have O =
{money, reward, life-expectancy}. The tables below depict the evaluation vectors (over
a life-time and ordered as in O) of one prospective consumer and the evaluations of the
industry with respect to the number θ ∈ {0, . . . , ν} of consumers who decide to smoke.
The money budget (already an aggregation) is expressed in kilo-dollars56; the addictive
reward is on an ordinal scale {1, 2, 3, 4}; life-expectancy is in years.
vconsumer not-active active advertise&active
not-smoking (48, 1, 75) (48, 1, 75) (48, 1, 75)
smoking (48, 1, 75) (12, 3, 65) (0, 4, 55)
vindustry(θ) not-active active advertise&active
(ν − θ)× (0,−,−) (0,−,−) (0,−,−)
+ θ × (0,−,−) (26,−,−) (36,−,−)
Pareto-Nash equilibria. If the industry is active, then for the consumer, deciding to
smoke or not depends on how the consumer subjectively values/weighs money, addic-
tion and life expectancy: both decisions are encompassed by Pareto-efficiency. For the
industry, advertise&active is a dominant strategy. Consequently, Pareto-Nash-equilibria
are all the action-profiles in which the industry decides advertise&active.
Efficiency. Since addiction is irrational (detailed in Appendix C), I focus on money
and life-expectancy. We have E = {θ(36, 55) + (ν − θ)(48, 75) | 0 ≤ θ ≤ ν} and
4 I am grateful to Cle´mence Cagnat-Lardeau for her help on modelling tobacco economy.
5 Note that most states set the prices of tobacco, hence prices do not follow supply/demand.
6 These numbers differ from [23] which aggregates everything (e.g. life expectancy) into money.
F = {ν(48, 75)}, where ν is the world’s population, and θ the number of smokers.
Since WST[E ] = {(36, 55)}, the MO-CR is the singleton {(75%, 73%)}: in the worst
case, we lose 12k$ and 20 years of life-expectancy per-consumer. These Pareto-Nash-
equilibria are the worst action-profiles for money and life-expectancy, a critical infor-
mation that was not lost by this MOG and its MO-CR.
Practical lessons. Advertising tobacco fosters consumption. The association “Alliance
contre le tabac” passed a law for standardized neutral packets (April 3rd 2015), in order
to annihilate all the benefits of branding, but only in France. The model indicates that:
This law will promote a higher economic efficiency.
4 Computation of the MO-CR
In this section, I provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of MO-CR
which relies on a very general procedure based on two phases:
1. Given a MOG, compute the worst equilibria WST[E ] and the efficient outcomes F .
2. Given WST[E ] and F , compute MO-CR = EFF[ R[ WST[E ] , F ] ].
Depending on the input (normal form or compact representation), it adapts as follows.
4.1 Computation of the MO-CR for Multi-objective Normal Forms
For a MOG given in MO normal form (which representation length is L = nαnd),
Phase 1 (computing WST[E ] and F) is easy and takes time O(L2) (see Appendix D).
For d = 2, this lowers to O(L log2(L)). Let us denote the sizes of the outputs q =
|WST[E ]| and m = |F|. For normal forms, it holds that q,m = O(|A|) = O(L).
For Phase 2, at first glance, the development of the intersection of unions
R[WST[E ],F ] = ∩y∈WST[E] ∪z∈F C(y/z) causes an exponential mq . But fortunately,
one can compute the MO-CR in polynomial time. Below, Dt is a set of vectors. Given
two vectors x, y ∈ Rd+, let x ∧ y denote the vector defined by ∀k ∈ O, (x ∧ y)k =
min{xk, yk} and recall that ∀k ∈ O, (x/y)k = xk/yk. Algorithm 1 is the develop-
ment of ∩y∈WST[E] ∪z∈F C(y/z), on a set-algebra of cone-unions. Appendix D shows
that Algorithm 1 takes time O((qm)2d−1d), or O((qm)2 log2(qm)) for d = 2.
Algorithm 1: Computing MO-CR in polynomial-time O((qm)2d−1d)
Input: WST[E ] = {y1, . . . , yq} and F = {z1, . . . , zm}
Output: MO-CR = EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]]
create D1 ← {y1/z ∈ Rd+ | z ∈ F}
for t = 2, . . . , q do
Dt ← EFF[{ρ ∧ (yt/z) | ρ ∈ Dt−1, z ∈ F}]
end
return Dq
Having specified Phase 1 and 2 for normal forms, Theorem 1 follows:
Theorem 1 (Computation of MO-CR). Given a MO normal form, one can compute
the MO-CR in polynomial time O(L4d−2). If d = 2, it lowers to O(L4 log2(L)).
4.2 Computation of the MO-CR for Multi-objective Compact Representations
Compact representations of massively multi-agent games (e.g. MO graphical games,
MO action-graph games) have a representation length L that is polynomial with respect
to the number of agents n and the sizes of the action-sets α. As q = |WST[E ]| and
m = |F| can be exponentials αn of this representation length, compact representations
are algorithmically more challenging, leaving open the computation of WST[E ] and F
in Phase 1, and complicating the use of Algorithm 1 in Phase 2. To overcome this,
one can do MO approximations [16], by implementing an approximate Phase 1 which
precision transfers to Phase 2 in polynomial time, as follows.
Lemma 1. Given ε1, ε2 > 0 and approximations E of E and F of F in the sense that:
∀y ∈ E ,∃y′ ∈ E, y % y′ and ∀y′ ∈ E,∃y ∈ E , (1 + ε1)y′ % y (3)
∀z′ ∈ F,∃z ∈ F , z′ % z and ∀z ∈ F ,∃z′ ∈ F, (1 + ε2)z % z′ (4)
it holds that R[E,F ] ⊆ R[E ,F ] and:
∀ρ ∈ R[E ,F ],∃ρ′ ∈ R[E,F ], (1 + ε1)(1 + ε2)ρ′ % ρ (5)
Equations (3) and (4) state approximation bounds. Equations (3) state that (1+ ε1)−1E
bounds below E which bounds below E . Equations (4) state that F bounds below F
which bounds below (1 + ε2)F . Crucially, whatever the sizes of E and F , there exist
such approximations E and F that are O((1/ε1)d−1) and O((1/ε2)d−1) sized [16],
yielding the approximation scheme below.
Theorem 2 (Approximation Scheme for MO-CR). Given a compact MOG of repre-
sentation length L, precisions ε1, ε2 > 0 and two algorithms to compute approxima-
tions E of E and F of F in the sense of Equations (3) and (4) that take time θE(ε1, L)
and θF (ε2, L), one can approximate R[E ,F ] in the sense of Equation (5) in time:
O
(
θE(ε1, L) + θF (ε2, L) + (ε1ε2)−(d−1)(2d−1)
)
For MO graphical games, Phase 1 could be instantiated with approximate junction-tree
algorithms on MO graphical models [9]. For MO symmetric action-graph games, in
the same fashion, one could generalize existing algorithms [11]. More generally, for
WST[E ] and F , one can also use meta-heuristics with experimental guarantees.
5 Prospects
Multi-objective games can be used as a behaviourally more realistic framework to
model a wide set of games occurring in business situations ranging from carpooling
websites to combinatorial auctions. Also, studying the efficiency of MO generalizations
of routing or Cournot-competitions [10] could provide realistic economic insights.
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A Why Smoothness will not work on multi-objective games
Most single-objective price of anarchy analytic results rely on a smoothness-analysis
[20]. A crucial step for “smoothness” is to sum the best response inequalities: For
a single-objective game and an equilibrium a ∈ PN, from the best-response con-
ditions ∀i ∈ N, ∀bi ∈ Ai, vi(a) ≥ vi(bi, a−i), one has: ∀b ∈ A,∑ni=1 vi(a) ≥∑n
i=1 v
i(bi, a−i). However, the Pareto-Nash-equilibrium conditions are rather: ∀i ∈
N, ∀bi ∈ Ai, vi(bi, a−i) 6 vi(a). As shown in the following counter-example, such 6
relations cannot be summed:(
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+
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)
Consequently, Smoothness-analysis does not encompass Pareto-Nash equilibria, re-
gardless of the efficiency measurement chosen.
B Properties of the Multi-objective Coordination Ratio
The Multi-objective Coordination Ratio fulfils a list of key good properties for the thor-
ough measurement of the multi-objective efficiency of MO games.
B.1 Worst case guarantee on equilibria outcomes
and No dictatorship on efficient outcomes
Each vectorial efficiency ratio that the MO-CR states, bounds below the efficiency for
each equilibrium outcome, compared to an existing efficient outcome:
∀ρ ∈ MO-CR[E ,F ], ∀y ∈ E , ∃z ∈ F , y/z % ρ
The process of measuring efficiency by MO-CR does not imply any choice in F that
would impose a point-of-view telling what efficiency should be (e.g. no five-year plans).
B.2 Multi-objective ratio-scale
Given E , F and r ∈ Rd++, it holds that:
MO-CR[E ,F ] ⊆ Rd+ (6)
MO-CR[{(0, . . . , 0)},F ] = {(0, . . . , 0)} (7)
MO-CR[r ? E ,F ] = r ?MO-CR[E ,F ] (8)
MO-CR[E , r ? F ] = MO-CR[E ,F ]/r (9)
E ⊆ F ⇔ (1, . . . , 1) ∈ MO-CR[E ,F ] (10)
Equation (6) states that the MO-CR is expressed in the multi-objective space. It is worth
noting that while MO-CR[E ,F ] ⊆ [0, 1]d is a more classical choice, MO-CR also al-
lows for measurements of over-efficiencies. (E.g. if F is a family-car and E is a Lam-
borghini, then there is over-efficiency on the speed objective.)
Equations (7), (8) and (9) state that MO-CR is sensitive on each objective to multi-
plications of the outcomes. For instance, if E is three times better on objective k, then
so is MO-CR. If there are twice better opportunities of efficiency in F on objective k′,
then MO-CR is one half on objective k′. In other words, the efficiency of each objective
independently reflects into the MO-CR in a ratio-scale.
If all equilibria outcomes are efficient (i.e. E ⊆ F), then this must imply
that according to the MO-CR, the MO game is fully efficient, that is: (1, . . . , 1) ∈
MO-CR[E ,F ]. The MO-CR seems to be the only multi-objective ratio-scale measure-
ment that fulfils Equation (10) while being a worst case guarantee on equilibria out-
comes with no dictatorship on what efficiency should be.
It is also worth noting that MO-CR is MO-monotonic with respect to E and F . For
X,Y ⊆ Rd+, letXDY denote Y ⊆ C(X) where C(X) = ∪x∈XC(x) (i.e.X dominates
Y ). Then it holds that:
E D E ′ ⇒ MO-CR[E ,F ]DMO-CR[E ′,F ] (11)
F D F ′ ⇒ MO-CR[E ,F ′]DMO-CR[E ,F ] (12)
C Bounded Rationality in Tobacco Consumption
According to the intrinsic theory of value [2], the value of a cigarette objectively
amounts to the quantities of raw materials used for its production, or is the combi-
nation of the labour times put into it [14]. However, each economic agent needs to
keep the freedom to evaluate and act how he pleases, in order to keep his good will
and some economic efficiency, as observed in the end of the Soviet Union. According
to the subjective theory of value [2], the value of a cigarette amounts to the price an
agent is willing to pay for it. Since the consumers value the product, then the industry
creates value [24]. However, this disregards what the disastrous consequence is on life
expectancy, belittles 7.500.000 deaths-per-year and emphasizes the bounded rationality
of behaviours. While for some health economists, consuming a cigarette is a rational
choice, as one values pleasure more than life expectancy, for others, consumers are
stuck into addiction before becoming adults. The truth is likely between these two ex-
treme points of view [23]: Economic agents discount the future at a rate of 6% per-year,
hence a day of life in 40 years is valued 10 times less than now, leading to overweight-
ing the actual smoking pleasure and to irrational behaviours with respect to preferences
over a full lifetime. Agents behave according to objectives (e.g. addictive satisfaction)
that they would avoid if they had the full experience of their lifetime (e.g. a lung cancer
with probability 1/2) and a sufficient will (e.g. quit smoking). Time discounting also
explains other non-sustainable behaviours like over-fishing catastrophes.
D Proofs
D.1 Phase 1 for Normal Forms, Correctness of Algorithm 1 and Theorem 1
Phase 1 is easy, if the MOG is given in normal form. The MOG is made of the MO
evaluations of each agent on each action-profile, that is: O(nαn) vectors. Hence, the
computation of u(A) requires for each a ∈ A, the addition of n vectors. There-
fore, the computation of u(A) takes time O(αnnd) (linear in the size of the in-
put) and yields O(αn) vectors. The computation of F = EFF[u(A)] given u(A)
takes time O(|u(A)|2d) = O(α2nd). To conclude, the computation of F takes time
O(nαnd + α2nd), which is polynomial (quadratic) in the size of the input. If d = 2,
this can be significantly lowered to O(nαnd+ αn log2(α
n)d) = O(nαn log2(α)).
The computation of WST[E ] can be achieved by first computing PN. For this
purpose, for each agent i ∈ N and each adversary action profile a−i ∈ A−i,
one has to compute which individual actions give a Pareto-efficient evaluation in
vi(Ai, a−i), in order to mark which action-profiles can be a PN from i’s point of
view. Overall, computing PN takes time O(nαn−1α2d). Using back u(A), computing
E = u(PN) is straightforward. Again, the computation of WST[E ] given E takes
time O(|E|2d) = O(α2nd). To sum up, the computation of WST[E ] takes time
O(nαn+1d+ α2nd). If d = 2, this lowers to O(nαn log2(α)).
In order to compute MO-CR = EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]], let us study the structure of⋂
y∈WST[E]
⋃
z∈F C(y/z), by restricting a set-algebra to the following objects:
Definition 5 (Cone-Union). For a set of vectors X ⊆ Rd+, the Cone-Union C(X) is:
C(X) =
⋃
x∈X
C(x) = {y ∈ Rd+ | ∃x ∈ X,x % y}
Let C denote the set of all cone-unions of Rd+.
To define an algebra on C, one can supply C with ∪ and ∩.
Lemma 2 (On the Set-Algebra (C,∪,∩)).
Given two descriptions of cone-unions X1, X2 ⊆ Rd+, we have:
C(X1) ∪ C(X2) = C(X1 ∪X2)
Given two descriptions of cones x1, x2 ∈ Rd+, we have:
C(x1) ∩ C(x2) = C(x1 ∧ x2)
where x1 ∧ x2 ∈ Rd+ is: ∀k ∈ O, (x1 ∧ x2)k = min{x1k, x2k}.
Given two descriptions of cone-unions X1, X2 ⊆ Rd+, we have:
C(X1) ∩ C(X2) = (∪x1∈X1C(x1)) ∩ (∪x2∈X2C(x2))
=
⋃
(x1,x2)∈X1×X2
C(x1) ∩ C(x2)
=
⋃
(x1,x2)∈X1×X2
C(x1 ∧ x2)
= C(X1 ∧X2)
where X1 ∧X2 = {x1 ∧ x2 | x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2} ⊆ Rd+.
Therefore, (C,∪,∩) is stable, and then is a set-algebra.
Proof. The three properties derive from set calculus.
The main consequence of Lemma 2 is that R[WST[E ],F ] = ∩y∈WST[E] ∪z∈F C(y/z)
is a cone-union. Moreover, one can do the development for ∩y∈WST[E] ∪z∈F C(y/z)
within the cone-unions, using distributions and developments.
Remark 1. For a finite set X ⊆ Rd+, we have: C(X) = C(EFF[X]).
Proof. Firstly, we prove C(X) ⊆ C(EFF[X]). If y ∈ C(X), then there exists x ∈ X
such that x % y. There are two cases, x ∈ EFF[X] and x 6∈ EFF[X]. If x ∈ EFF[X],
then y ∈ C(EFF[X]), by definition of a cone-union. Otherwise, if x 6∈ EFF[X], then
there exists z ∈ X such that z  x. And since X is finite, we can find such a z in
EFF[X], by iteratively taking z′  z until z ∈ EFF[X], which will happen because
X is finite and  is transitive and irreflexive. Hence, there exists z ∈ EFF[X] such
that z  x % y and then z % y. Consequently, y ∈ C(EFF[X]), by definition of a
cone-union.
Conversely, Y ⊆ X ⇒ C(Y ) ⊆ C(X) proves C(EFF[X]) ⊆ C(X).
As a consequence of Remark 1, for x ∈ Rd+, a simple cone C(x) is fully described by
its summit x. The main consequence of this remark is that C(X) can be fully described
and represented by EFF[X]. For instance, since R[WST[E ],F ] is a cone-union (thanks
to Lemma 2), and since MO-CR = EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]] (by definition of the MO-CR),
then R[WST[E ],F ] is fully represented (as a cone-union) by the MO-CR, which means
that R[WST[E ],F ] = C(MO-CR).
Recall that q = |WST[E ]| and m = |F|. In this subsection, we also denote WST[E ] =
{y1, . . . , yq} and F = {z1, . . . , zm}. Let Amq denote the set of functions pi from
{1, . . . , q} to {1, . . . ,m}. (We have: |Amq | = mq .)
Corollary 1 (The cone-union of MO-CR).
Given WST[E ] = {y1, . . . , yq} and F = {z1, . . . , zm}, we have:
R[WST[E ],F ] =
⋃
pi∈Amq
q⋂
t=1
C(yt/zpi(t))
and therefore:
MO-CR = EFF
[{∧q
t=1
yt/zpi(t) | pi ∈ Amq
}]
Proof. For the first statement, just think to a development. We write down
R[WST[E ],F ] = ∩y∈WST[E] ∪z∈F C(y/z) into the layers just below. There is one layer
per yt in WST[E ] = {y1, . . . , yt, . . . , yq}:
( C(y1z1 ) ∪ C(y
1
z2 ) ∪ . . . ∪ C( y
1
zm ) ) layer 1⋂
( C(y2z1 ) ∪ C(y
2
z2 ) ∪ . . . ∪ C( y
2
zm ) ) layer 2
...⋂
( C(yqz1 ) ∪ C(y
q
z2 ) ∪ . . . ∪ C( y
q
zm ) ) layer q
Imagine the simple cones as vertices and imagine edges going from each vertex of
layer t to each vertex of the next layer (t + 1). The development into a union outputs
as many intersection-terms as paths from the first layer to the last one. Let the function
pi : {1, . . . , q} → {1, . . . ,m} denote a path from layer 1 to layer q, where pi(t) is the
vertex chosen in layer t. Consequently, in the result of the development into an union,
each term is an intersection
⋂q
t=1 C(yt/zpi(t)).
The second statement results from the first statement, Lemma 2 and Remark 1.
R[WST[E ],F ] =
⋃
pi∈Amq
q⋂
t=1
C(yt/zpi(t))
=
⋃
pi∈Amq
C
(
q∧
t=1
yt/zpi(t)
)
= C
({
q∧
t=1
yt/zpi(t) | pi ∈ Amq
})
That R[WST[E ],F ] = C(MO-CR) concludes the proof.
Ultimately, this proves the correctness of Algorithm 1 for the computation of MO-
CR, given WST[E ] = {y1, . . . , yq} and F = {z1, . . . , zm}. It consists in the iterative
development of the intersection R(E ,F), which can be seen as dynamic programming
on the paths of the layer graph. For k ∈ {1, . . . , q}, we denote Dt the description of the
cone-union corresponding to the intersection:
C(Dt) = ∩tl=1 ∪z∈F C(yl/z)
Recursively, for t > 1, C(Dt) = C(Dt−1) ∩ (∪z∈F C(yt/z)). From Lemma 2 and
Remark 1, in order to develop, we then have to iterate the following:
Dt = EFF[{ρ ∧ (yt/z) | ρ ∈ Dt−1, z ∈ F}]
We now proceed with the time complexity of Algorithm 1. At first glance, since there
aremq paths in the layer graph, then there areO(mq) elements in MO-CR. Fortunately,
they are much less, because we have:
Theorem 3 (MO-CR is polynomially-sized).
Given a MOG and denoting d = |O|, q = |WST[E ]| and m = |F|, we have:
|MO-CR| ≤ (qm)d−1
Proof. Given ρ ∈ MO-CR, for some pi ∈ Amq , we have ρ =
∧q
t=1 y
t/zpi(t), and
then ∀k ∈ O, ρk = mint=1...q{ytk/zpi(t)k }. Therefore, ρk is exactly realized by the
kth component of at least one cone summit yt/zpi(t) in the layer graph (that is a vertex
in the layer-graph above). Consequently, there are at most as many possible values for
the kth component of ρ, as the number of vertices in the layer graph, that is qm. This
holds for the d components of ρ; hence there are at most (qm)d vectors in MO-CR.
More precisely, by Lemma 3 (below), since MO-CR is an efficient set, then there are at
most (qm)d−1 vectors in MO-CR.
Lemma 3. Let Y ⊆ Rd+ be a set of vectors, with at mostM values on each component:
| EFF[Y ] | ≤Md−1
Proof. At most Md−1 valuations are realized on the d− 1 first components. If you fix
the d−1 first components, there is at most one Pareto-efficient vector which maximizes
the last component.
In Algorithm 1, there are Θ(q) steps. At each step t, from Theorem 3, we know that
|Dt−1| ≤ (qm)d−1. Hence, |{ρ ∧ (yt/z) | ρ ∈ Dt−1, z ∈ F}| ≤ qd−1md, and the
computation of the efficient setDt requires timeO((qd−1md)2d). However, by using an
insertion process, since there are at most B = |Dt| ≤ (qm)d−1 Pareto-efficient vectors
at each insertion, then we only need O(qd−1md × (qm)d−1) Pareto-comparisons. If
d = 2, time lowers to O(qd−1md log2(qm)d
2) = O(qm2 log2(qm)).
Ultimately, Algorithm 1 takes q steps and then time O(q(qd−1md)(qm)d−1d) =
O((qm)2d−1d). If d = 2, this lowers to O((qm)2 log2(qm)).
D.2 Approximations: Proof of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2
Proof. (1) First, let us show R[E,F ] ⊆ R[WST[E ],F ]. Let ρ′ be a ratio of R[E,F ]
and let us show that:
∀y ∈WST[E ], ∃z ∈ F , s.t.: y % ρ′ ? z
Take y ∈ WST[E ]. From Equation (3) (first condition), there is a y′ ∈ E such that
y % y′. From Definition 4, there is a z′ such that y′ % ρ′ ? z′. From Equation (4) on z′
(first condition), there exists z ∈ F such that z′ % z. Recap: y % y′ % ρ′ ? z′ % ρ′ ? z.
(2) Then, let ρ be a ratio of R[WST[E ],F ], and let us show that ρ′ = (1 + ε1)−1(1 +
ε2)
−1ρ is in R[E,F ], that is:
∀y′ ∈ E, ∃z′ ∈ F, (1 + ε1)y′ % (1 + ε2)−1ρ ? z′
Take an element y′ of E. From Equation (3) (second condition), there is y ∈ WST[E ]
such that (1 + ε1)y′ % y. From Definition 4, there is z ∈ F such that y % ρ ? z. From
Equation (3) on z (second condition), there exists z′ ∈ F s.t. z % (1 + ε2)−1z′. Recap:
(1 + ε1)y
′ % y % ρ ? z % (1 + ε2)−1ρ ? z′.
Proof (Theorem 2). For the first claim, since Algorithm 1, given E and F , outputs
the MO-PoA corresponding to R[E,F ], by Theorem 2, Algorithm 1 outputs an ((1 +
ε1)(1 + ε2))-covering of R(WST[E ],F).
For the second claim, from Lemma 1, applying Algorithm 1 on E and F
outputs an ((1 + ε1)(1 + ε2))-covering of R(WST[E ],F). Moreover, since we
have |E| = O((1/ε1)d−1) and |F | = O((1/ε2)d−1), Algorithm 1 takes time
O
(
d/(ε1ε2)
(d−1)(2d−1)).
